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Abstract	
	
This	article	analyses	the	causal	factors	underlying	the	formation	of	French	preferences	
during	 the	 Eurozone	 crisis	 solving	 process	 (2008-2017).	 Going	 beyond	 the	 clear	
distinction	between	national	preference	 formation	and	 interstate	bargaining	of	 liberal	
intergovernmentalism,	 this	 article	 combines	 new	 intergovernmentalism,	 political	
economy	and	feedback	loops	to	study	the	horizontal	 linkages	between	different	actors	
included	 in	 the	process	 of	 domestic	 preference	 formation.	Based	on	 the	EMU	Choices	
dataset,	 which	 includes	 semi-structured	 interviews	 conducted	 with	 French	 policy-
makers	 involved	 in	 the	 EU	 negotiations	 at	 the	 highest	 level,	 we	 will	 concentrate	 on	
French	 preference	 formation	 in	 four	 negotiations	 at	 the	 EU	 level:	 the	 May	 3	 2010	
agreement	on	bilateral	loans	to	Greece,	the	initial	capitalization	amount	of	the	European	
Stability	 Mechanism	 (ESM),	 the	 negotiations	 on	 the	 legal	 nature	 of	 the	 “debt-brake”	
included	in	the	TSCG,	and	the	Reverse	Qualified	Majority	Voting	(RQMV)	procedure.	The	
article	shows	that	confidential	and	restricted	administrative	networks	played	a	central	
role	 in	 reducing	 the	 uncertainty	 stemming	 from	 the	 fragile	 financial	 positions	 of	 the	
hypertrophied	 domestic	 banking	 system.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 French	 negotiators	 found	
themselves	 between	 a	 rock	 and	 a	 hard	 place	 during	 negotiations	 at	 the	 EU	 level,	 not	
crossing	 the	 red	 line	 fixed	 by	 Germany,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 ensuring	 that	 policy	
solutions	were	 compatible	with	governmental	political	 stance	and	domestic	 economic	
interests.	 Contrary	 to	 recent	 research	 pointing	 out	 to	 the	 increasing	 influence	 of	
domestic	 public	 opinion	 on	 national	 preference	 formation,	 however,	 feedback	 loops	
between	the	outcome	of	the	crisis	solving	process	and	French	politics	and	policies	had	
very	little	impact.	
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Introduction	
	
The	newly	elected	French	President	Emmanuel	Macron	made	it	very	clear	in	2017	that	
France	is	forcefully	returning	to	the	European	Union	negotiation	table.	In	his	speech	at	
the	 Sorbonne	 on	 September	 26,	 2017,	 he	 advanced	 his	 proposals	 for	 a	 reinforced	
Economic	 and	 Monetary	 Union	 (EMU):	 “What	 we	 need	 is	 a	 long-term	 economic	 and	
political	strategy,	and	our	challenge	within	the	eurozone	is	to	work	out	how	to	make	it	
an	economic	power	which	can	compete	with	China	and	the	United	States	[…]	And	I	am	
shouldering	 and	 will	 continue	 to	 shoulder	 France’s	 responsibility,	 because	 it	 is	 in	 the	
interests	 of	 France	 and	 Europe,	 but	we	 also	 need	 common	 rules	 and	 instruments.	We	
need	convergence	and	stability	through	national	reforms,	but	also	by	coordinating	our	
economic	policies	and	a	common	budget1.”		
	
This	 statement	 is	 in	 line	 with	 French	 preferences	 on	 the	 Eurozone	 institutional	
architecture.	 Since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1980s,	 French	 governments	 have	 been	 seeking	 to	
complement	 rules-based	 EMU	 with	 a	 “gouvernement	 économique”	 which	 is	 a	 fuzzy	
concept	 aiming	 at	 increasing	 economic	 policy	 coordination	 and	 fostering	 EU-level	
interventionism	in	order	to	promote	growth	and	create	jobs	without	losing	sovereignty	
(Howarth	 2007,	 p.	 1062).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 French	 politicians	 have	 been	 using	 EMU	
rules	as	a	“useful	external	constraint”	to	reform	their	economies	in	the	face	of	domestic	
resistance	 (Howarth	2007,	p.	 1061).	When	Emmanuel	Macron	underlines	 that	he	will	
“shoulder	 France’s	 responsibility,”	 he	 relies	 on	 the	 EMU	 imperative	 to	 legitimise	
domestic	reforms,	but	he	also	hints	at	a	new	external	constraint.	Indeed,	the	new	French	
government	is	trying	to	overcome	previous	policy	deadlocks	between	Paris	and	Berlin	
by	restoring	French	credibility	with	the	implementation	of	structural	reform	in	order	to	
push	forward	new	Eurozone	arrangements2.	
	
These	elements,	while	crucial	 to	understand	France’s	position	 in	 the	EU,	however,	are	
focusing	 on	 the	 president’s	 office	 only.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	 open	 up	 this	
institutional	black	box	and	to	understand	how	and	through	which	mechanisms	France’s	
national	preferences	with	regard	to	 the	EU	are	established.	More	precisely,	 the	article	
analyses	 the	 causal	 factors	 underlying	 the	 formation	 of	 French	 preferences	 on	 the	
reforms	of	Eurozone	governance	during	the	crisis	(2010-2017).	In	line	with	the	overall	
puzzle	 of	 this	 special	 issue,	 which	 studies	 how	 political	 actors	 arrive	 at	 their	
‘preferences’	 in	 EU	 decision-making,	 we	 use	 an	 original	 framework	 based	 on	 the	
combination	of	three	conceptual	perspectives:	new	intergovernmentalism,	the	effects	of	
feedback-loops	 between	 public	 policy	 and	 public	 opinion	 and	 the	 political	 economy	
literature	on	the	state-finance	nexus.		
	
France	in	this	context	 is	to	be	considered	a	hard	or	most	 likely	case	(Bennett	2004,	p.	
50).	Due	to	the	centralised	French	political	system,	 the	French	government	has	a	high	
																																																						
1	http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-
europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/	accessed	July,	24,	2018.	Emphases	are	ours.		
2	Brunsden	Jim,	«	EU	certifies	Emmanuel	Macron	has	delivered	on	deficit	promise	»,	Financial	Times,	May	23,	
2018	
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level	of	policy	autonomy	regarding	interstate	bargaining	issues.	In	particular,	under	the	
Fifth	 Republic,	 authority	 over	 European	 affairs	 is	 concentrated	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	
president,	 supported	 by	 a	 small	 number	 of	 high-level	 civil	 servants.	 Cole	 and	 Drake	
(2000,	 p.	 28)	 contend	 that	 the	 presidential	 pre-eminence	 in	 European	 affairs	was	 so	
pronounced	that	Europe	was	considered	to	form	part	of	a	 ‘reserved	sector’	where	the	
main	European	decisions	have	been	taken	by	French	Presidents,	in	coordination	with	a	
small	 group	 of	 high	 civil	 servants	 and	 the	 main	 economic	 interest	 groups.	 This	
understanding	 of	 preference	 formation	 would	 be	 consistent	 with	 the	 core	 aspect	 of	
liberal	 intergovernmentalism	 (LI),	 which	 argues	 that	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	
government	 and	 the	main	 economic	 interest	 groups	 explains	 how	 governments	 form	
their	 preferences.	 These	 preferences	 (demands)	 are	 then	 defended	 at	 the	 EU	 level,	
where	 ‘a	 process	 of	 interstate	 strategic	 interaction	 defines	 the	 possible	 political	
responses	 of	 the	 EC	 political	 system	 to	 pressures	 from	 those	 governments	 (supply)’	
(Moravcsik,	1993,	481).	
	
We	 argue,	 however,	 that	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	process	 of	 preference	 formation,	
even	 in	 an	 extremely	 centralised	 country	 such	 as	 France,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 take	 into	
account	the	political	economy	of	the	state-finance	nexus,	horizontal	influence	stemming	
from	other	EU	 countries	 (in	 particular	Germany),	 and	 feedback	 loops.	 Indeed,	 French	
negotiators	 found	 themselves	between	a	 rock	and	a	hard	place	during	negotiations	at	
the	 EU	 level.	 They	 integrated	 the	 red	 lines	 fixed	 by	 Germany	 and	 other	 creditor	
countries	in	order	to	build	a	space	for	policy	compromises	and	combined	those	with	the	
strong	level	of	economic	patriotism	existing	at	the	domestic	level.	The	strong	autonomy	
of	French	negotiators	also	had	an	impact	on	domestic	politics.	
	
From	 a	 methodological	 perspective,	 we	 rely	 on	 the	 EMU	 Choices	 dataset3,	 which	
includes	 semi-structured	 interviews	 conducted	with	 high-level	 civil	 servants	 in	 every	
EMU	country.	More	precisely,	 two	out	of	the	four	French	interviewees4	were	sitting	at	
the	 Economic	 and	 Financial	 Committee	 (EFC),	which	 is	 the	 preparatory	 committee	 of	
Eurogroup,	 Ecofin	 and	 European	 Council	meetings	 and,	 hence,	 the	 heart	 of	 Eurozone	
governance	 (Grosche	 &	 Puetter	 2008,	 Fontan	 2013).	 In	 order	 to	 triangulate	 the	
gathered	 data,	 we	 also	 include	 interviews	 with	 EFC	 members	 from	 Belgium,	
Netherlands	 and	 Luxembourg	 and	 secondary	 sources.	 These	 interviews	 aimed	 at	
outlining	the	construction	of	national	preferences	related	to	four	case	studies:	the	initial	
Greek	rescue,	the	capitalisation	of	the	European	Stability	Mechanism,	the	legal	nature	of	
the	 debt	 brake	 enshrined	with	 the	 Treaty	 on	 Stability,	 Coordination	 and	 Governance	
(TSCG)	and	the	Reverse	Qualified	majority	voting.		
	
The	article	is	structured	as	follows:	in	a	first	section,	we	present	the	combination	of	the	
theoretical	frameworks	guiding	the	article.	A	second	section	applies	this	framework	to	
the	empirical	analysis.		
																																																						
3	https://emuchoices.eu/.	A	quantitative	database	concentrates	on	all	major	issues	relating	to	EMU	reforms	
sonce	2010.	Amongst	those,	four	have	been	selected	as	most	different	cases	by	the	consortium	members	in	
order	to	conduct	in-depth	interviews	with	key	decision-makers	in	all	28	member	States:	the	May	3	2010	
agreement	on	bilateral	loans	to	Greece,	the	initial	capitalization	amount	of	the	European	Stability	Mechanism	
(ESM),	the	negotiations	on	the	legal	nature	of	the	“debt-brake”	included	in	the	TSCG;	the	Reverse	Qualified	
Majority	Voting	(RQMV)	procedure.	
4	The	other	two	were	respectively	part	of	the	European	Affairs	division	of	the	French	Treasury	and	of	the	
French	Permanent	Representation	in	Brussels.		
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1.	Accounting	for	preferences		
	
Preference	formation	in	the	European	Union	in	general	has	been	analysed	prominently	
by	 liberal	 intergovernmentalist	 (LI)	 approaches	 (Moravcsik	 1993,	 1998;	
Schimmelfennig	2015).	Based	on	a	three-step	model	–	domestic	preference	 formation,	
intergovernmental	bargaining	and	supranational	institution	building.	
	
According	to	Moravcsik	(1998:	24),	national	preferences	are	an	‘ordered	and	weighted	
set	of	 values	placed	on	 future	 substantive	outcomes’	which	are	driven	by	geopolitical	
and	economic	interests	in	relation	to	European	integration.	Preferences	are	‘not	simply	
a	particular	set	of	policy	goals	but	a	set	of	underlying	national	objectives	independent	of	
any	particular	 international	negotiation’	 (Moravcsik	1998,	p.	20).	As	underlined	 in	 the	
introduction	 to	 this	 special	 issue,	 this	 definition	 implies	 a	 series	 of	 elements	 that	 are	
open	for	discussion.	First,	 it	claims	that	preference	formation	precedes	European	level	
dialogue	and	 thus	 implies	a	 temporal	 sequencing.	Second,	 the	definition	allows	 for	an	
analytical	 differentiation	between	 ‘preference	 formation’	 and	what	 is	 labelled	here	 as	
‘position-taking’	 (on	positions	during	 intergovernmental	negotiations,	 see	also	Degner	
&	Leuffen	2017,	p.	3).	The	latter	occurs	during	intergovernmental	meetings	and	may	be	
the	 result	 of	 compromises,	 side-payment,	 alternative	 coalitions,	 etc.	 (Moravcsik	 1998,	
pp.	 64-66.)	 While	 national	 ‘positions’	 can	 thus	 change,	 LI	 assumes	 that	 national	
‘preferences’	are	stable.			
Third,	 LI	 also	 argues	 that	 the	preferences	 of	 governments	 regarding	 the	 creation	 and	
the	rules	of	EMU	result	 from	a	small	number	of	actors.	 In	the	case	of	macro-economic	
policy	coordination,	most	economic	agents	have	ambiguous	and	variable	interests	since	
it	 is	 difficult	 for	 them	 to	 calculate	 their	 net	 costs	 and	benefits	 (Moravcsik	1993:	 493-
494).	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why	 French	 banks	 and	 other	 economic	 agents	 showed	 a	
‘cautious	 and	 conditional	 support’	 for	 the	 single	 currency,	 and,	 while	 present	 in	 the	
debate,	 did	 not	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 preferences	 (Moravcsik	 1998:	
409).	 Moravcsik	 (1993:	 493)	 also	 underlines	 that,	 in	 times	 of	 economic	 crises,	
governments	‘may	act	without	direct	pressure	from	interested	parties’	since	the	level	of	
uncertainty	 rises.	 In	 other	 words,	 according	 to	 the	 LI	 framework,	 the	 French	
government	 should	 enjoy	 considerable	 leeway	 from	 domestic	 interest	 groups	 during	
the	Eurozone	crisis	negotiations.		
	
	
While	LI	offers	a	parsimonious	account	of	preference	formation,	which	seem	well-suited	
for	a	centralized	country	like	France,	 it	does	not	account	for	three	structural	elements	
which	became	increasingly	important	during	the	Eurozone	crisis:	the	horizontal	aspect	
of	 preference	 formation,	 i.e.	 the	 influence	 of	 debates	 taking	 place	 in	 other	 member	
states	on	domestic	preference	formation	as	analysed	by	new	intergovernmentalism	and	
the	concept	of	“nested	games”;	eventual	feedback	loops,	i.e.	the	debate	triggered	by	the	
implementation	 of	 decisions	 in	 the	 domestic	 realms	 which	 feeds	 back	 again	 into	
domestic	 preference	 formation	 (Hooghe	 and	 Marks	 2009;	 Schmidt	 &	 Crespy	 2014	;	
Saurugger	2014,	Hix	2018);	and	the	role	played	by	policy	networks	at	the	heart	of	the	
“state-finance	nexus”	 in	 times	of	 financial	uncertainty.	Hence,	our	aim	 is	 to	go	beyond	
the	 LI	 framework	 to	 explain	 more	 accurately	 the	 formation	 of	 French	 preferences	
during	the	Eurozone	crisis.	
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Taking	other	States	into	account:	new	intergovernmentalism	and	nested	games	
	
The	management	of	 the	Eurozone	crisis	has	been	considered	as	an	 intergovernmental	
process,	 excluding	 de	 facto	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Commission,	 but	
empowering	 the	European	Central	Bank	 (ECB).	The	weakness	or	 even	 absence	of	 the	
community	 method	 in	 the	 management	 of	 the	 euro	 crisis	 left	 Member	 states	 with	
unanimity	 decision-making	 rules.	 New	 intergovernmentalism	 stresses	 that	 in	 this	
context,	 consensus-seeking	and	 iterative	negotiations	have	become	 the	guiding	norms	
in	EU	intergovernmental	politics	(Puetter	2012,	Puetter	2014,	Bickerton	et	al	2015).	In	
this	 context,	 preferences	 of	 other	member	 states	 are	 scrutinised	 in	 advance	 by	 their	
partners	 and	 influence	 domestic	 preference	 formation	 since	 their	 inception,	 and	 not	
only	during	the	bargaining	phase	as	argued	by	the	LI	framework.		
	
This	understanding	of	preference	formation	not	only	as	a	vertical	channel	(from	interest	
groups	 to	 the	 government)	 but	 also	 as	 a	 horizontal	 channel	 is	 also	 consistent	 with	
Tsebelis	 (1990)	 nested	 games.	 Nested	 games	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 way	 of	
transplanting	context	into	game	theory.	Instead	of	assuming	that	actors	play	games	in	a	
vacuum,	 it	 shows	 that	 these	 games	 are	 embedded	 in	 some	 higher-order	 network.	 In	
Tsebelis	 approach	 this	 higher-order	 game	 determines	 the	 payoffs	 of	 the	 players:	
deviation	from	the	optimal	outcome	of	the	negotiations	on	a	given	policy	subject	might	
be	 compensated	by	 gains	 on	 another	 topic.	 In	 fact,	 the	 iteration	of	 nested	 games	was	
crucial	 during	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 single	 currency	 as	 “it	 opened	 opportunities	 for	
political	 players	 to	 redefine	 what	 constituted	 appropriate	 strategy	 and	 optimal	
outcomes	in	EMU	negotiations”	(Dyson	&	Featherstone	1999,	pp.	46-47).	
	
According	to	new	intergovernmentalism,	the	institutional	environment	of	the	European	
Council	 and	 its	 preparatory	 committees	 align	 the	 preferences	 of	 member	 state	
administrations	 including	 senior	 bureaucrats	 and	 political	 decision-makers	 within	 a	
transnational	 policy-making	 environment.	 Preference	 formation,	 as	 a	 process	 which	
involves	 governmental	 elites,	 thus,	 has	 become	 transnational.	 An	 example	 of	 such	
transnationalisation	 of	 preference	 formation	 is	 the	 Franco-German	 couple.	 In	 the	
context	 of	 EMU	 reforms,	 the	 Franco-German	 couple	 has	 indeed	 not	 only	 strongly	
influenced	 the	 intergovernmental	 bargaining	 process	 as	 Degner	 and	 Leuffen	 (2017)	
have	 underlined,	 but	 also	 domestic	 preference	 formation.	 France	 and	 Germany	 forge	
their	 preferences	 through	 bilateral	 contacts	 between	 governments	 and	 the	
subordinated	 bureaucracies	 (Degner	 and	 Leuffen	 2017).	 Even	 though	 German	 and	
French	political	economy	and	economic	cultures	diverge	(Clift	2013,	Clift	&	Woll	2012),	
their	pre-negotiation	exchanges	lead	to	a	rapprochement	on	a	large	number	of	points.		
	
	
Feedback	loops:	EU	Decision-making	under	domestic	public	scrutiny	
	
As	pointed	out	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 this	 special	 issue,	policy	approaches	allow	us	 to	
model	 the	 circular	 relationship	 between	 preference	 formation,	 decision-making	 and,	
again,	 preference	 formation.	 	 Decision-making	 takes	 place	 in	 complex	 environments	
(Simon	1985,	1997;	Jones	2001).	The	multilevel	character	of	the	European	Union	adds	
further	complexity	to	this	understanding	of	preference	formation:	preference	formation	
is	 a	more	 complex	 process	 than	 the	 result	 of	 a	 series	 of	 linear	 “push	 factors.”	 It	 is	 a	
circular	 process	 through	which	political	 elites	 and	 experts,	 interest	 groups	 and	 social	
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movements	as	well	as	the	media	frame	a	problem	and	influence	state	actors	in	defining	
national	preferences.	Decisions	taken	on	the	basis	of	these	preferences	at	the	European	
level	 then	 influence	 again	 domestic	 actors	who	 adjust	 and	 adapt	 their	 positions,	 and	
ultimately	transform	national	polities.		
	
According	 to	 the	 public	 policy	 literature,	 feedback	 loops	 understood	 here	 as	 the	
interplay	 between	 the	 domestic	 public	 opinion	 and	 decision	makers	 (Campbell	 2003,	
Pierson	1993)	should	play	an	 increased	role	 in	 times	of	economic	and	 financial	crises	
since	the	salience	of	economic	issues	should	increase.	In	other	words,	when	the	salience	
of	an	issue,	understood	as	the	perception	of	the	importance	of	the	issue	for	the	public,	
increases,	 even	 complex	 and	 very	 technical	 issues	 become	 more	 resistance-prone	
(Wlezien	 2005).	 Indeed,	 a	 publicly	 perceived	 threat	 and	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	
increase	the	salience	of	an	issue	and	might	lead	to	an	increased	probability	for	actors	to	
oppose	governmental	decisions.	In	turn,	a	higher	degree	of	politicisation,	understood	as	
the	process	of	making	citizens	and	concerned	actors	more	involved	in	politics,	is	often	
perceived	as	having	influenced	policy	positions	of	member	states,	such	as	France,	which	
searched	to	renegotiate	policies	at	the	EU	level	(Hooghe	and	Marks	2009;	Paterson	et	al.	
2010).	Domestic	opposition	is	taken	up	by	national	representatives	and	translated	again	
at	the	EU	level:	Member	States	reopen	debates	on	specific	policy	instruments,	insisting	
on	 the	 difficulty	 of	 implementing	 them	 at	 the	 domestic	 level	 and	 ask	 for	 a	
reinterpretation	of	these	issues.			
	
Reducing	uncertainty:	policy	networks	and	the	state-finance	nexus	
	
While	 the	 new	 intergovernementalism	 approach	 and	 the	 public	 policy	 literature	
postulate	 that	 feedback	 loops	 increase	 politicisation,	 deliberation	 and	 the	 number	 of	
players	 involved	within	 policy-making	 processes	 in	 times	 of	 crisis,	 another	 stream	of	
literature	focused	on	crises	show	that	opposite	dynamics	are	at	play.	In	times	of	crisis,	
uncertainty	increases	and	standard	operating	procedures	can	rarely	be	applied.	Crises	
trigger	 a	 perception	 of	 urgency	 which	 usually	 leads	 to	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 number	 of	
actors	 involved	 in	 finding	 solutions	 to	 the	 problem	 (Boin	 et	 al	 2005;	 Saurugger	 &	
Terpan	 2016;	 Degner	 2018).	 In	 fact,	 these	 unexpected	 critical	 junctures	 reveal	 the	
balance	of	power	within	political	systems	since	it	is	only	the	most	powerful	players	who	
are	participating	in	emergency	meetings	(Dobry	1992).		
	
In	this	context,	tight	and	small	policy	networks	between	civil	servants	and	private	banks	
play	 a	 preeminent	 role	 to	 reduce	 the	 high-level	 of	 uncertainty	 caused	 by	 financial	
markets	destabilisation	 in	 a	 short	period	of	 time	 (Fontan	2013,	Woll	 2014).	To	grasp	
why	these	networks	are	so	powerful,	we	rely	on	the	political	economy	literature	on	the	
“state	-finance	nexus”,	which	explains	how	the	financialization	of	French	economy	led	to	
an	 intertwining	of	 states’	and	banks’	 interests.	Since	 the	1970’s,	political	 leaders	have	
been	 increasingly	 governing	 through	 financial	 markets,	 i.e.	 they	 relied	 on	 financial	
markets	and	instruments	as	a	form	of	statecraft	to	achieve	economic	goals,	which	they	
could	not	attain	anymore	with	fiscal	and	budgetary	policies	(Epstein	2017,	Braun	et	al.	
2018:	104).		
	
With	 the	support	of	 the	State,	French	banks’	balance-sheets	expanded	up	 to	 the	point	
that	 they	 became	 “too-big	 to	 bail”:	 in	 2008,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 three	 largest	 banks	 was	
equivalent	 to	 350%	 of	 the	 French	 GDP	 (Blyth	 2013).	 Moreover,	 since	 these	 banks	
	
	 7	
became	 the	main	 dealers	 of	 the	 French	 sovereign	 debt,	 the	 French	 state	 has	 become	
dependent	on	them	to	refinance	its	debt	at	low	cost	(Lemoine	2016).	Finally,	since	the	
creation	 of	 the	 Eurozone,	 the	 links	 between	 French	 banks	 and	 the	 balance-sheets	 of	
peripheral	 Eurozone	 member-states	 dramatically	 increased	 following	 a	 wave	 of	
transnational	mergers	 and	 acquisitions	 and	 the	 purchase	 and	 recycling	 of	 peripheral	
sovereign	debt	on	repo	markets	(Gabor	&	Ban	2016).	In	other	words,	although	French	
banks	 were	 indecisive	 about	 their	 interests	 during	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Eurozone	
(Grossman	2004),	 they	 quickly	 learned	 to	 recognize	 the	 opportunities	 offered	by	 this	
new	context	and	they	engaged	in	a	cross-border	expansion.		
	
We	mobilise	this	political	economy	literature	on	the	state-finance	nexus	to	have	a	more	
fine-grained	 view	 on	 the	 formation	 of	 domestic	 preferences.	While	 the	 LI	 framework	
distinguishes	 between	 states’	 and	 banks’	 interests,	 this	 political	 economy	 approach	
underlines	 that	 the	 financialization	 of	 our	 economies	 led	 to	 an	 entanglement	 of	 their	
interests.	Hence,	the	policy	networks	located	at	the	heart	of	the	state-finance	nexus	play	
a	 preeminent	 role	 in	 the	 crisis	 resolution	 process	 because	 they	 have	 an	 insider	
knowledge	 of	 states’	 and	 banks’	 respective	 exposures	 and	 they	 are	 used	 to	 form	
coalitions	to	defend	their	 intertwined	 interests.	 In	other	words,	 these	policy	networks	
were	 the	main	 promoters	 and	 defenders	 of	 French	 “economic	 patriotism”	 during	 the	
Eurozone	crisis	(Clift	&	Woll,	2012).		
	
How	to	reconcile	the	contradictory	crisis-induced	effects	observed	by	the	public	policy	
and	the	political	economy	literature?	Braun	(2015)	offers	a	solution	to	this	conundrum	
by	 distinguishing	 two	 distinct	 public	 policy	 phases:	 a	 phase	 of	 emergency	 crisis	
management	 and	 a	 subsequent	 institution-building	 phase.	 In	 an	 emergency,	 decision-
making	 is	 usually	 restricted	 to	 a	 small	 number	 of	 actors,	 whereas	 in	 the	 follow-up	
process	leading	to	policy	change,	these	focusing	events	(Kingdon	1984,	Birkland	1997)	
often	 lead	 to	 a	 broadening	 of	 the	 policy	 community,	 including	 the	media	 and	 a	 large	
number	of	groups.		
	
French	preferences	during	the	Eurozone	crisis	
	
French	 officials	 have	 pushed	 forward	 the	 idea	 of	 a	gouvernement	 économique	 since	 a	
declaration	made	by	Pierre	Bérogovoy	in	the	early	1990s,	in	which	he	argued	in	favour	
of	broad	orientations	of	 the	ECOFIN	 in	both	monetary	and	economic	policy	 (Howarth	
2007:	1067).	The	last	three	French	presidents	reiterated	this	position:	Nicolas	Sarkozy	
in	 a	 statement	 made	 at	 the	 European	 Parliament	 on	 October	 21,	 2008	 (Jabko	 and	
Massoc,	2012;	Clift	&	Ryner	2014),	Francois	Hollande	on	the	campaign	trail	of	the	2012	
French	 presidential	 election	 (Clift	 2013)	 and	 Emmanuel	Macron	 in	 his	 speech	 at	 the	
Sorbonne	 in	 September	 20175.	 In	 fact,	 the	 underlying	 tension	 beneath	 the	 concept	 of	
gouvernement	économique	 studied	by	Howarth	(2007)	 in	pre-crisis	 times	continues	 to	
exist.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 French	 governments	 try	 to	 deepen	 the	 Eurozone	 economic	
integration	 and	 fiscal-sharing	 mechanisms	 by	 promoting	 instruments	 such	 as	
Eurobonds.	On	the	other	hand,	they	seek	to	avoid	the	automaticity	of	sanctions	attached	
to	 strict	 fiscal	 rules,	 or	 any	 form	of	 binding	 economic	 policy	 coordination	 that	would	
leave	to	a	loss	of	sovereignty.		
	
																																																						
5	See	footnote	1	
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In	 this	 section,	 we	 analyse	 the	 process	 of	 French	 preference	 formation	 on	 four	 EMU	
crisis	measures	identified	as	nodal	and	controversial	by	the	EMU	Choices	project.	While	
the	 first	 two	measures	were	 taken	during	 the	 emergency	 crisis	management,	 the	 two	
following	 ones	 belong	 to	 the	 institution-building	 phase.	 First,	we	 focus	 on	 the	May	3,	
2010	 agreement	 on	 bilateral	 loans	 to	 Greece	 since	 it	 is	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 five-month	
negotiation	on	financial	rescue	mechanisms.	Second,	we	turn	to	the	capitalisation	of	the	
European	 Stability	 Mechanism	 (ESM)	 whose	 size	 was	 fiercely	 debated	 between	
Eurozone	member	states.	Third,	we	study	negotiations	on	the	legal	nature	of	the	“debt-
brake”	 included	 in	 the	 TSCG	 because	 it	 crystallised	 long-lasting	 debates	 on	 the	
compliance	 to	 the	EMU	 rules-based	 systems.	 Fourth,	we	pay	 attention	 to	 the	Reverse	
Qualified	Majority	 Voting	 (RQMV)	 procedures,	which	 also	 touches	 upon	 the	 sensitive	
issue	of	sovereignty	losses	since	it	aims	at	strengthening	the	sanctions	attached	to	the	
infringing	of	fiscal	rules.		
	
Policy	networks	and	uncertainty	
	
Since	 at	 least	 the	 1980s,	 networks	 of	 high-level	 civil	 servants	 and	 private	 bankers	
defend	 and	 promote	 French	 interests	 within	 the	 EMU	 policy-making	 process	 (Cerny	
1989,	Dyson	&	Featherstone	1999,	Hardie	&	Howarth	2009,	Clift	2012,	Jabko	&	Massoc	
2012,	Bezes	&	Le	Lidec,	2015,	p.	502).	These	networks	unite	key	sectors	of	the	French	
administration	in	charge	of	European	Economic	governance	(the	head	of	the	Treasury	
and	 the	 economic	 advisers	 of	 the	 French	 presidency)	 and	 the	 chairpersons	 of	 the	 six	
largest	 banks	 (Crédit	 Agricole,	 BNP	 Paribas,	 Société	 Générale,	 Crédit	 Mutuel,	 Caisse	
d’épargne	and	Banque	Populaire).	Close	to	this	small	core	of	civil	servants	and	private	
bankers,	 the	 governor	 of	 the	 Banque	 de	 France	 and	 the	 Finance	 minister	 are	 also	
involved	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 French	 preferences,	 albeit	 on	 secondary	 and	 non-urgent	
issues.		
	
These	 networks	 are	 characterised	 by	 a	 strong	 homogeneity,	 which	 is	 caused	 by	 the	
similar	 social	 backgrounds	 of	 its	 members	 and	 revolving	 doors	 between	 high-level	
French	 administration	 and	 private	 banks.	 This	 homogeneity	was	 a	 powerful	 strategic	
asset	for	the	French	governments	when	it	had	to	provide	financial	support	to	its	banks	
after	 the	 collapse	of	Lehman	Brothers.	Compared	 to	other	national	 arrangements,	 the	
French	bail-out	was	costless	for	the	taxpayer6	because	of	the	swift	agreement	between	
the	State	and	its	banks	(Woll	2014).	Unsurprisingly,	 the	homogeneity	of	French	policy	
networks	allowed	to	bridge	potentially	different	interests	between	the	different	actors	
involved	 (Jabko	 &	 Massoc	 2012).	 In	 fact,	 scholars	 argue	 that	 the	 French	 economic	
governance	is	post-dirigist	because	these	networks	align	the	interests	of	private	banks	
and	the	state	(Clift	2012,	Clift	&	Woll	2012).	Hence,	French	economic	policy-making	is	
characterised	by	a	close	co-operation	between	banks	and	the	State,	a	situation	that	fits	
well	 within	 the	 liberal	 intergovernmentalist	 approach	 because	 their	 interests	 are	
aligned	and	not	confrontational	(Grossman	&	Woll	2014).		
	
While	 the	 academic	 literature	 has	 studied	 these	 networks	 in	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 the	
subprime	 crisis,	 it	 has	 not	 yet	 thoroughly	 scrutinized	 their	 role	 in	 later	 stages	 of	 the	
crisis,	when	the	locus	of	policymaking	moved	from	the	national	stage	to	the	EMU	circles.	
Our	 interviews	 show	 that	 these	 small	 French	 policy	 networks	 have	 been	 crucial	 in	
																																																						
6	One	important	exception,	however,	is	the	bail-out	of	Dexia.		
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reducing	the	high	level	of	 financial	uncertainty	caused	by	the	crisis.	Two	players	were	
central	in	the	formation	of	French	preferences	during	the	negotiations	on	the	first	Greek	
bail-out	(February-June	2010):	the	top	civil	servants	at	the	Treasury	and	the	cabinet	of	
the	 French	 presidency.	 More	 precisely,	 these	 players	 were	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 policy	
networks	at	both	national	and	supranational	levels.		
	
First,	 information	 sharing	 within	 French	 policy	 networks	 helped	 civil	 servants	 to	
determine	precisely	the	extent	of	banks’	exposure	to	Greek	sovereign	debt	(and	later	on,	
on	 the	 sovereign	 debt	 of	 other	 peripheral	 countries)	 and,	 hence,	 to	 design	 policy	
solutions	 accordingly.	More	 precisely,	 French	 civil	 servants	made	 a	 deal	 with	 French	
banks	–	based	on	the	Vienna	initiative	template7	–	as	early	as	in	February	2010:	banks	
committed	 to	 keep	 Greek	 debt	 on	 their	 balance-sheets	 in	 order	 to	 stabilise	 its	 value	
while	 the	French	government	ensured	that	Greek	debt	would	not	be	restructured	and	
that	it	would	provide	liquidity	to	the	Greek	government	in	order	to	ensure	the	payment	
of	 coupons	 to	 its	 creditors	 (Interview	 2).	 Indeed,	 in	 late	 2009,	 French	 banks	 and	
insurance	groups	held	26%	of	the	Greek	severing	debt	purchased	by	foreign	investors,	
well	 above	 German	 financial	 institutions	 (15%)8.	 If	 the	 Greek	 debt	 would	 have	 been	
restructured,	BNP	Paribas,	the	largest	French	bank	whose	assets	are	worth	120%	of	the	
French	GDP,	should	have	been	recapitalised	(Interview	3).	As	Figure	1	shows	below,	the	
evolution	 of	 French	 banks’	 exposure	 to	 the	 Greek	 sovereign	 debt	 is	 in	 line	 with	 this	
bargaining:	French	banks	held	 their	 level	of	exposure	 to	 the	Greek	debt	 from	the	 first	
half	of	2010	until	they	started	to	fire-sale	Greek	bonds	just	before	their	restructuring	in	
mid-2012.			
	
	
Source	:	BIS	statistics	warehouse,	compiled	by	the	authors	
	
In	parallel,	the	Presidency’s	cabinet	played	a	key	role	in	persuading	Nicolas	Sarkozy	that	
a	 common	 rescue	 fund	 was	 compulsory	 to	 stabilise	 the	 French	 banking	 system	 and	
alleviate	 systemic	 risks	 within	 the	 Eurozone	 (Interview	 2).	 In	 short,	 the	 first	 Greek	
																																																						
7	The	Vienna	initiative	is	a	private-public	framework	where	large	banks	and	supranational	institutions	
coordinate	to	maintain	bank	exposure	in	East,	Central	and	South	East	Europe.		
8	Jack	Ewing	“Germany	Already	Carrying	a	Pile	of	Greek	Debt”.	The	New	York	Times,	April	28th,	2010.	
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/business/global/29banks.html.	
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rescue	 was	 aligned	 with	 the	 French	 preferences	 (financial	 assistance	 without	 debt	
restructuring).	 Insider	 reports	underline	 that	 French	officials	were	 at	 the	 forefront	of	
the	resistance	against	the	option	of	debt	restructuring	because	of	French	bank	exposure	
during	 the	 Spring	 2010	 meetings	 involving	 agents	 from	 the	 International	 Monetary	
Fund	(IMF),	 the	Commission,	 the	European	Central	Bank	and	European	member	state	
governments	(Blustein	2015:	9-119).			
	
Second,	members	of	 the	Treasury	sit	at	 the	most	 important	meetings	 in	 the	Eurozone	
governance:	 the	 Eurogroup	 and,	 even	more	 importantly,	 its	 preparatory	 councils:	 the	
Economic	 and	 Financial	 Committee	 (EFC)	 and	 the	 Eurogroup	 Working	 Group	
subcommittee.	For	example,	 the	European	Financial	Stability	Fund,	 the	predecessor	of	
the	European	Stability	Mechanism,	was	set	up	behind	the	closed	doors	of	a	Eurogroup	
working	 group	meeting	during	 the	weekend	of	May	9,	 2010	 (Fontan	2013).	 Treasury	
members	relied	on	their	participation	to	these	meetings	to	gather	information	about	the	
crisis	 resolution	 process	 before	 other	 French	 civil	 servants.	 This	 ensures	 a	 strong	
leverage	in	favour	of	the	Treasury	when	interministerial	struggles	occur.	For	example,	
the	Treasury	and	the	Foreign	Office	hold	opposite	views	on	the	future	of	EU	integration.	
On	the	one	hand,	the	Treasury	supports	an	integrationist	perspective	because	the	topics	
on	which	it	is	competent	are	already	negotiated	at	the	EU	level.	From	this	perspective,	
more	transfer	of	competences	at	the	EU	level	gives	more	power	to	the	Treasury,	which	
is	 in	 favour	of	a	new	EU	treaty	 (interview	1).	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	Foreign	Office	 is	
more	focused	on	the	defence	of	French	sovereignty	and	is	opposed	to	a	new	Treaty.	This	
was	especially	true	when	Laurent	Fabius,	a	proponent	of	the	2005	“No”	campaign	was	
the	Foreign	Affairs	minister	(2012-2014).	This	asymmetry	of	power	might	explain	why	
France	 has	 been	 advocating	 for	 further	 integration	 of	 the	 Eurozone	 during	 the	 crisis	
(Schimmelfenning	2015).	
		
In	short,	the	French	Eurozone	governance	system	is	strongly	dominated	by	small	policy	
networks	of	 civil	 servants	 and	private	bankers.	At	 the	 administrative	 level,	 the	policy	
positions	 of	 Treasury	 and	 the	 Presidency	 are	 homogenous	 because	 of	 the	 strong	
personal	 links	 between	 their	 members,	 which	 are	 fostered	 by	 similar	 education	 and	
career	paths	(interview	4).	 In	 the	case	of	 the	 first	Greek	rescue,	 the	positions	of	 these	
small	 policy	 circles	 were	 unambiguously	 influenced	 by	 a	 strong	 degree	 of	 economic	
patriotism:	the	priority	of	the	French	government	was	to	protect	its	banking	system	and	
avoid	 a	 second	 recapitalisation.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 exposure	 of	 French	 banks	 to	
peripheral	sovereign	debt	heavily	influenced	national	preferences.	More	generally,	they	
are	 supporting	 further	 integration	 of	 the	 Eurozone,	which	 follows	 a	 historical	 French	
stance	 on	 EU	 economic	 integration.	 The	 homogeneity	 of	 positions	 within	 the	 French	
administration	 stands	 in	 strong	 contrast	 with	 Germany,	 which	 was	 riven	 by	
administrative	division	between	the	minister	of	Finance	and	the	minister	of	Economy,	
which	 mirrors	 the	 political	 struggles	 between	 the	 members	 of	 the	 governmental	
coalition	(see	Degner	&	Leuffen	in	this	SI).		
	
The	horizontal	dimension	of	Eurozone	policy-making.	
	
																																																						
9	See	also	Catan,	Thomas	&	Ian	Talley.	«	Past	Rifts	Over	Greece	Cloud	Talks	on	Rescue	».	Wall	Street	Journal,	
October	8th,		2013,	sect.	Europe.	
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304441404579119180237594344.	
	
	 11	
According	 to	 the	 LI	 framework,	 the	 formation	 of	 national	 preferences	 is	 independent	
from	 international	 bargaining	 (cf.	 section	 I).	 Here,	 however,	 our	 research	 results	
strongly	 undermine	 this	 assumption:	 French	 preferences	 were	 influenced	 from	 their	
inception	by	German	preferences	and	by	the	iterative	nested	games,	which	characterise	
Eurozone	policy-making.	
	
First,	 the	 formation	 of	 French	 preferences	 is	 historically	 intertwined	 with	 German	
preferences.	Academics	who	study	the	central	role	played	by	the	Franco-German	couple	
in	the	Eurozone	answer	to	the	financial	crisis	disagree,	however,	on	the	power	balance	
between	the	two	countries	and	their	impact	on	the	Eurozone	crisis	regulation	process.	
On	the	one	hand,	some	scholars	argue	that	Germany	is	a	“reluctant	hegemon”	since	its	
representatives	 rely	 on	 its	 economic	 power	 to	 play	 a	 “waiting	 game”	 during	 the	
Eurozone	 crisis	 negotiations	 (Bulmer	 2014).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 France	 is	merely	
another	Eurozone	country	affected	by	German	strategies	without	being	able	to	modify	
them	(Clift	&	Ryner	2014,	Lux	2018).	On	the	other	hand,	a	small	number	of	researchers	
claim	 that	 Germany’s	 preferences	 were	 strongly	 undermined	 by	 French	 ones’	
(Rothacher	 2015;	 Degner	 &	 Leuffen	 2017;	 Schild	 2013).	 According	 to	 these	 scholars,	
post-crisis	Eurozone	policies	were	mainly	influenced	by	the	French	governments,	which	
managed	to	“invert	the	rules	of	the	Maastricht	Treaty”	(Rothacher	2015).	Between	these	
two	 opposite	 poles,	 a	 third	 group	 of	 scholars	 recognise	 that	 post-crisis	 policies	 stem	
from	 a	 compromise	 struck	 between	 the	 two	 largest	 Eurozone	 countries	 whose	
preferences	gradually	converged	(Schmidt	&	Crespy	2014,	Van	Esch	2014).		
	
Our	research	findings	show	that	while	French	policy	space	was	constrained	by	German	
preferences,	 the	 outcome	 of	 Eurozone	 negotiations	 did	 not	 contradict	 French	 “red	
lines.”	 When	 Eurozone	 countries	 set	 up	 the	 European	 Stability	 Mechanism,	 French	
negotiators	 recognised	 that	 they	would	 have	 preferred	 a	 higher	 capitalisation	 (which	
was	set	at	€500bn)	but	they	did	not	ask	for	it	since	German	negotiators	would	not	agree	
with	 it.	 In	 the	 words	 of	 a	 Treasury	 agent:	 “French	 negotiators	 internalise	 German	
preferences	 when	 building	 their	 policy	 positions.	 We	 would	 not	 propose	 a	 policy	
blueprint	that	would	go	against	German	red	lines”	(Interview	3).	French	negotiators	are	
updated	about	the	evolution	of	German	red	 lines	because	they	are	 in	constant	contact	
through	 direct	 phone	 lines	 with	 their	 German	 counterparts	 sitting	 at	 the	 Eurogroup	
preparatory	 committees	 (interviews	 1,	 2,	 4).	 These	 open	 lines	 of	 communication	
between	EFC	members	occur	because	they	meet	each	other	on	a	very	regular	basis	and	
they	are	sharing	the	willingness	to	strike	policy	compromises,	which	are	constrained	by	
the	 red	 lines	 set	 up	 in	 Berlin	 and	 Paris.	 In	 the	 words	 of	 one	 member	 of	 the	 French	
permanent	representation	“these	channels	of	communication	are	open	in	order	to	find	a	
proper	balance	between	the	 logic	of	conditionality	and	debt	mutualisation	“(interview	
4).	 These	 research	 results	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 main	 tenets	 of	 the	 new	
intergovernementalist	 framework,	which	emphasises	 that	 transnational	policy-making	
environment	 increases	consensus-seeking	behaviour	 (cf.	 section	2).	While	LI	accounts	
would	argue	here	 that	 the	process	of	preference	 formation	still	 remains	distinct	 from	
the	 intergovernmental	 bargaining	 phase,	 we	 see	 here	 empirically	 that	 these	 two	 are	
interlinked.		
	
Second,	even	though	Germany	constrains	its	policy	space,	France	is	still	one	nodal	point	
of	 Eurozone	 negotiations.	 Indeed,	 Luxembourgish,	 Dutch	 and	 Belgian	 EFC	 members	
underline	that	the	Eurozone	policy	space	is	shaped	by	three	groups	of	players:	Germany	
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and	 other	 ordo-liberal	 countries	 (Finland,	Netherlands),	 France	 and	 Southern	 Europe	
countries	 (Spain,	 Italy)	 and	 supranational	 institutions	 (European	 Commission,	
European	Central	Bank).	Other	countries	usually	follow	the	positions	defined	within	one	
of	 the	 nodal	 points	 or	 try	 to	 build	 bridges	 between	 them	 (interviews	 5,	 6,	 7).	 This	 is	
because	 smaller	 Eurozone	 countries	 do	 not	 have	 the	 necessary	 expertise	 or	 the	
structural	 power	 to	 define	 their	 policy	 positions	 autonomously	 for	 each	 EMU	
negotiation.	France,	like	Germany	or	the	European	Commission,	does.		
	
In	addition	of	having	the	ability	to	build	its	policy	position	autonomously,	France	relied	
on	iterative	Eurozone	nested	games	to	ensure	that	policy	compromises	did	not	deviate	
too	far	away	from	its	preferences.	For	example,	French	negotiators	underlined	that	the	
capitalisation	 of	 the	 ESM	 was	 less	 important	 than	 its	 instrumental	 use,	 which	 was	
enlarged	 to	 bank	 bail-outs	 following	 French	 pressure	 (interviews	 2	 and	 3).	 In	 other	
words,	 French	 negotiators	 “caved	 in”	 on	 the	 capitalisation	 of	 the	 ESM	 but	 they	 put	 a	
constant	pressure	on	German	negotiators	in	order	to	increase	the	flexibility	in	the	use	of	
its	 instruments.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 France	 agreed	 to	 implement	 the	 “debt-brake”	
enshrined	within	the	TSCG	for	two	reasons.	First,	French	negotiators	did	not	cross	their	
“red	 lines”:	 the	debt	brake	was	not	written	down	within	 the	Constitution	because	 the	
government	wanted	to	avoid	a	constitutional	revision.	Instead,	France	built	an	alliance	
with	 Italy	 to	 push	 forward	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 implementation	 of	 an	 organic	 law	was	 a	
sufficient	 commitment	 (interview	2).	 	Moreover,	 French	negotiators	 obtained	 implicit	
counterparts	 from	 their	 partners.	 More	 precisely,	 the	 TSCG	 was	 part	 of	 a	 Franco-
German	compromise	 in	which	Germany	accepted	the	creation	of	a	Banking	Union	and	
France	 agreed	 on	 stricter	 fiscal	 rules	 (interview	 3).	 The	 ECB	 was	 also	 part	 of	 the	
compromise	 according	 to	 one	 EFC	 member:	 “The	 decisive	 moment	 was	 the	 ECB	
measures.	 When	 the	 ECB	 announced	 its	 Long	 –Term	 Refinancing	 Operations	 in	 late	
2011,	the	implicit	counterpart	for	these	measures	was	the	implementation	of	the	TSCG.	
This	 is	 how	 it	 has	 been	 "sold"	 to	 French	 Members	 of	 the	 Parliament”	 (interview	 2).	
Moreover,	even	when	a	policy	contrary	to	French	interest	is	negotiated	at	the	Eurozone	
level,	French	negotiators	ensure	that	the	final	agreement	offers	enough	caveats	before	
accepting	it.	For	example,	French	negotiators	agreed	on	the	RQMV10	reform,	when	they	
were	convinced	that	the	proposal	was	blurry	enough	to	avoid	automatic	sanctions	and	
that	 the	 European	 Commission	 would	 not	 have	 enough	 political	 power	 to	 start	 the	
adequate	procedures	(Interviews	1&2).	
	
In	 sum,	 the	 formation	 of	 French	 domestic	 preferences	 is	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 the	
dynamics	of	Eurozone	negotiations	and	represents	what	can	be	called	a	‘multilevel	and	
iterative	 nested	 game’.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Germany	 and	 France	 are	 engaged	 in	 an	
asymmetrical	 power	 game	 in	 which	 French	 negotiators	 ‘internalise’	 German	
preferences,	 while	 the	 opposite	 might	 not	 be	 true.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 France	 is	
sufficiently	 powerful	 to	 exploit	 the	 policy	 spaces	 offered	 by	 the	 Eurozone	 iterative	
nested	games	and	it	manages	to	strike	policy	compromises	that	do	not	infringe	its	red	
lines.	Finally,	the	open	communication	lines	and	the	high	level	of	trust	between	the	EFC	
members	help	member-states	 to	 formulate	 initial	policy	positions	 that	are	sufficiently	
close	to	each	other	for	policy	compromises	to	be	struck.			
																																																						
10	The	RQMV	proposal	was	put	forward	by	the	Benelux	countries	in	order	to	avoid	breaches	of	the	Stability	and	
Growth	Pact	by	large	member-states,	as	it	occurred	in	2005	(interviews	5,6,7).	Hence,	it	is	not	part	of	a	specific	
Franco-German	deal.		
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Feedback	loops	
	
As	already	underlined,	the	French	Fifth	Republic	gives	a	high-level	of	autonomy	to	the	
government	and	its	administrative	branches	in	European	negotiations.	 	Moreover,	this	
autonomy	 was	 strengthened	 in	 2002	 when	 the	 French	 political	 system	 became	
unambiguously	 presidential.	 Finally,	 the	 temporal	 pressures	 induced	 by	 financial	
markets	pressures	 in	times	of	crisis	reduce	the	number	of	players	directly	 involved	in	
the	negotiations	(cf.	section	1).		
	
These	 factors	 explain	 why	 French	 negotiators	 were	 isolated	 from	 the	 pressures	 of	
political	parties	and	other	administrative	bodies	during	the	crisis	management	stages.	
For	 example,	 during	 the	 week-end	 preceding	 the	 set-up	 of	 a	 €125bn	 rescue	 fund	 to	
recapitalise	 the	 Spanish	 banking	 system	 in	 2012,	 two	 members	 of	 the	 Treasury	
confirmed	 the	 financial	commitment	of	 the	French	government	by	phone	 to	 their	EFC	
partners	without	 consulting	 other	 domestic	 players	 (interview	1	&	 2).	 In	 fact,	 all	 our	
interviewees	 agree	 that,	 outside	 the	 Treasury	 and	 the	 Presidency’s	 office,	 other	
administrative	 and	 political	 bodies,	 including	 the	 Parliament,	 the	 governing	 and	
opposition	parties,	did	not	play	a	role	during	the	crisis	management	phase	(Interviews	
1,2,3,4).	They	point	out	the	temporal	pressures	induced	by	financial	instability	and	the	
high	 level	 of	 expertise	 needed	 to	 deal	 with	 financial	 rescue	 schemes	 to	 explain	 this	
outcome.	In	addition	of	the	institutional	and	contextual	 factors	outlined	above,	French	
political	 history	 provides	 other	 explanatory	 elements.	 Since	 the	 2005	 referendum	 on	
the	EU	 constitutional	 treaty,	 the	 Socialist	 party	 dodges	European	 issues	 because	 they	
proved	to	be	divisive	(interview	1).	 Interestingly,	 the	EMU	choices	dataset	shows	that	
this	high	level	of	power	concentration	within	the	hands	of	a	few	players	is	only	found	in	
those	 Eurozone	 countries	 that	 were	 granted	 financial	 loans	 or	 were	 under	 severe	
financial	pressures,	such	as	Spain,	Italy	and	Greece.		
	
Our	research	results	 therefore	question	previous	studies	on	French	preferences	about	
financial	 rescue	 schemes,	 which	 are	 supposed	 to	 shift	 in	 2012	 because	 of	 increasing	
popular	 discontentment.	 Indeed,	 Rothacher	 (2015,	 p.	 272)	 relies	 on	 five	 non-
longitudinal	polls	to	state	that	growing	popular	aversion	against	the	ESM	led	to	a	shift	in	
governmental	preferences.	In	a	similar	vein,	Crespy	&	Schmidt	(2014)	rely	on	polls	and	
discursive	 analysis	 to	 point	 out	 that	 French	 leaders’	 discourse	 was	 influenced	 by	
shifting	stances	of	their	constituency	on	this	 issue.	This	divergence	of	research	results	
may	 be	 explained	 by	 different	 methodologies.	 Whereas	 we	 rely	 on	 interviews	 with	
policy-makers	 at	 the	 highest	 level	 to	 analyse	 the	 impact	 of	 public	 opinion	 on	 the	
formation	 of	 French	 preferences,	 other	 studies	 rely	 on	 polls	 (whose	 significance	 on	
complex	economic	matter	should	be	seriously	questioned11)	and	the	analysis	of	political	
discourses	(which	are	not	necessarily	aligned	with	policy	preferences).		
	
The	French	situation	stands	in	high	contrast	with	other	countries,	such	as	Germany	and	
Netherlands,	 where	 EFC	 participants	 must	 obtain	 a	 negotiation	 mandate	 from	 their	
parliaments	 and	 report	 on	 the	 final	 agreements	 in	 front	 of	 them.	 Sometimes,	 these	
auditions	 were	 broadcasted	 on	 national	 TV	 (Interview	 5).	 Counter-intuitively,	 these	
strong	 controls	 gave	 some	 leverage	 to	 the	 Dutch	 and	 German	 EFC	 representatives.	
																																																						
11	On	the	issue	of	citizens’	«	non-attitudes	»	on	complex	policy	tools,	see	Zaller	(1992).	
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Indeed,	tying	its	own	hands	proved	to	be	a	winning	strategy	for	these	countries	during	
the	 Eurozone	 negotiations	 since	 it	 narrows	 down	 the	 set	 of	 policy	 options	 in	 their	
favour,	 a	 strategy	 in	 line	with	Putnam’s	 two-level	 games	 and	win	 set	 theory	 (Putnam	
1988).	 A	 French	 EFC	member	 acknowledges	 that	 they	 did	 not	 discuss	 policy	 options	
such	as	Eurobonds	in	early	2010	because	its	German	counterpart	repeated	that	he	did	
not	have	 the	negotiating	mandate	allowing	him	to	participate	 in	such	 talks	 (interview	
2).	This	can	be	considered	to	be	the	reason	why	Finance	ministers	asked	the	Assemblée	
Nationale	 to	 hold	 ex-post	 hearings	 after	 the	 negotiations.	 This	 option	 was,	 however,	
declined	 by	 the	 members	 of	 parliaments	 who	 argue	 they	 were	 lacking	 time	 and	
technical	skills	(Interview	4).		
	 	
While	 the	 autonomy	 of	 French	 negotiators	 is	 the	 general	 rule	 of	 thumb	 in	 crisis	
emergency	times,	the	salience	of	policy	issues	during	institution-building	phases	brings	
back	into	play	other	administrative	bodies	and	political	institutions.	The	ratification	of	
the	TSCG	is	a	point	in	case.	During	our	interviews,	French	negotiators	framed	the	TSCG	
as	 a	 political	 issue	 while	 the	 Greek	 rescue,	 the	 set-up	 of	 the	 European	 Stability	
Mechanism	 and	 the	 reverse	 Qualified	 majority	 voting	 were	 considered	 as	 technical	
issues	 (Interviews	1	 and	2).	Why	was	 the	TSCG	 the	most	politicised	 topic	of	 our	 four	
case	studies?	
	
First,	members	 of	 parliament	 (MPs)	 return	 in	 the	 policy-making	 process	 because	 the	
TSCG	 was	 designed	 as	 an	 intergovernmental	 treaty,	 which	 needs	 parliamentary	
approval	 for	 ratification.	 In	 addition,	 there	 was	 more	 interministerial	 coordination	
because	 the	 TSCG	 impacted	 more	 public	 policies	 than	 the	 set-up	 of	 financial	 rescue	
schemes.	An	EFC	member	underlines	that	when	the	TSCG	was	negotiated,	they	were	in	
constant	liaison	with	MPs	in	order	to	ensure	that	they	would	accept	to	ratify	the	Treaty	
(Interview	 1).	Moreover,	 the	 Prime	Minister	 and	 its	 administrative	 body	 tasked	with	
interministerial	 coordination	 for	 EU	 issues	 (Secrétariat	 Général	 des	 Affaires	
Européeennes)	also	went	back	into	play.	Second,	fiscal	issues	are	more	salient	than	other	
economic	 policies12.	 In	 the	 words	 of	 an	 EFC	 member,	 “parliamentary	 hearings	 were	
tough	and	MPs	worked	on	 their	 issues	more	 intensively	 than	 in	usual	 times	 to	corner	
the	government”	(Interview	1).	Because	the	TSCG	was	more	politicised,	public	opinion,	
political	parties	and	media	put	French	negotiators	under	more	pressure	than	with	other	
Eurozone	 issues.	 In	 other	 EU	 countries	 such	 as	 Netherlands	 and	 Belgium,	 the	 TSCG	
negotiations	 were	 also	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 for	 the	 political	 parties	 and	
administrative	bodies	to	increase	their	participation	in	the	EU	negotiations,	from	which	
they	had	been	excluded	in	the	earlier	stages	of	the	crisis	(Interviews	5	&	6).	
	 	
Because	 the	 TSCG	was	 the	most	 politicised	 topic,	we	would	 expect	 feedback	 loops	 to	
play	 a	 more	 important	 role	 in	 the	 policy-making	 process:	 	 governmental	 positions	
should	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 outcomes	 of	 public	 debates	 and/or	 partisan	 dynamics.	 The	
campaign	of	 the	2012	French	presidential	election	hinted	 that	 this	would	be	 the	case.	
Indeed,	European	issues	were	at	the	centre	of	the	two	main	political	parties’	manifestos	
and	 speeches	 (Grossman	 &	 Sauger	 2014;	 Crespy	 &	 Schmidt	 2014).	 More	 precisely,	
Francois	Hollande	pledged	that,	if	he	would	be	elected,	he	would	renegotiate	the	TSCG	
																																																						
12	Similarly,	during	the	creation	of	the	Eurozone,	monetary	policy	was	framed	as	a	technical	issue	whose	
management	should	be	left	in	the	hands	of	independent	central	bankers	whereas	fiscal	coordination	was	
considered	to	be	within	the	realm	of	politics	(Dyson	and	Featherstone	1999).	
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in	order	 to	put	more	emphasis	on	growth	 issues.	Our	 interviews	show,	however,	 that	
the	 Treasury	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 “reminding	 previous	 French	 engagements	
(made	 under	 Sarkozy	 presidency)	 to	 its	 EU	 partners”	 to	 the	 newly	 elected	 French	
President	 (Interview	1).	Despite	 intense	pressures	 from	 its	own	political	party,	which	
would	eventually	 lead	 to	 the	secession	of	a	group	of	MPs	nicknamed	“Les	 frondeurs13”	
President	Hollande	caved	in	on	its	campaign	promise	and	did	not	renegotiate	the	TSCG.	
This	 outcome	 led	 one	of	 our	 interviewees	 to	 state	 “On	Eurozone	 issues,	 the	Treasury	
matters	more	than	the	Socialist	party”	(interview	1).	In	a	more	nuanced	light,	while	the	
Treasury	 and	 its	 networks	 played	 a	 role	 in	 the	 continuity	 of	 French	 positions,	 other	
factors	were	at	play,	 such	as	 the	 refusal	of	Germany	 to	 reopen	 the	negotiation	on	 the	
TSCG	(interview	3).		
	
Grossman	&	Sauger	(2014)	underline	that	the	rapid	fall	of	popular	support	towards	F.	
Hollande	after	his	election	was	not	different	from	secular	Fifth	Republic	trends14.	Yet,	it	
would	 be	 short-sighted	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 U-turn	 on	 the	 TSCG	 did	 not	 impact	 the	
Hollande	 presidency.	 Indeed,	 the	 secession	 of	 “Les	 Frondeurs”	 five	 months	 after	 the	
election	 of	 Francois	 Hollande	 weakened	 the	 internal	 cohesion	 of	 the	 Socialist	 Party	
during	 the	 whole	 term.	 Moreover,	 like	 other	 European	 social-democracy	 parties,	 the	
implementation	 of	 fiscal	 austerity	 policies	 enshrined	 within	 the	 TSCG	 weakens	
considerably	 the	 ideological	 cohesiveness	 of	 the	 Socialist	 party,	 which	 traditionally	
promote	Keynesian-inspired	economic	policies	(Escalona	et	al.	2013).	 In	turn,	the	 lack	
of	internal	and	ideological	cohesiveness	were	conducive	to	the	historical	collapse	of	the	
Socialist	 party	 in	 the	 2017	 presidential	 elections	 (Lefebvre	 2017).	 Beyond	 partisan	
consequences,	 our	 observations	 are	 also	 consistent	 with	 the	 “post-democracy”	
theoretical	framework,	which	emphasises	that	political	change	between	centre	left	and	
centre-right	parties	does	not	lead	to	different	economic	policies	(Crouch	2004,	Streeck	
&	 Schäffer	 2013,	 Glencross	 2018).	 These	 authors	 also	 claim	 that	 this	 lack	 of	 change	
weakens	 voter	 turn-out,	which	was	 observed	 in	 the	 2017	 elections	 (Braconnier	 et	 al.	
2017).		
	
In	sum,	French	policy	networks	enjoy	a	very	high	level	of	autonomy	when	they	set	up	
the	French	policy	positions	on	Eurozone	issues,	especially	during	the	crisis	emergency	
phase.	 On	matters	 that	 are	 deemed	 as	 “technical,”	 they	 are	 virtually	 the	 only	 players	
involved	in	the	negotiations,	with	the	cabinet	of	the	French	Presidency.	While	this	high	
level	of	autonomy	was	a	strategic	asset	when	bailing	out	the	banking	system	in	the	early	
stages	of	the	financial	crisis,	the	“tying	hands”	strategy	of	Dutch	and	German	negotiators	
proved	to	be	more	successful	in	the	Eurozone	negotiations.			
	
On	 more	 politicised	 topics,	 these	 policy	 networks	 are	 challenged	 by	 other	
administrative	bodies	and	political	parties	but	 they	manage	 to	retain	control	over	 the	
build-up	 of	 French	 preferences.	 Indeed,	 on	 the	 TSCG,	 which	 was	 a	 highly	 politicised	
topic,	French	preferences	remained	surprisingly	stable	because	the	Treasury	managed	
to	circumvent	political	resistance.	 In	other	words,	 the	centrality	of	autonomous	policy	
networks	 within	 the	 French	 governance	 circumvent	 the	 feedback	 loops	 that	 should	
																																																						
13	Les	frondeurs	did	not	leave	the	Socialist	Party,	nor	its	party	group	in	the	Parliament.	Yet,	their	opposition	to	
Hollande’s	economic	stance	was	reflected	in	the	media	and	their	dissenting	votes	(Clift	&	McDaniel	2017:	408).		
14	The	hyper-personalisation	of	power	under	the	5th	Republic	leads	Presidency	candidates	to	overpledge	on	
their	capacity	to	govern	on	the	campaign	trail	and	disappoints	voters	later	on.		
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nourish	 policy-making	 within	 liberal	 democracies,	 even	 when	 topics	 are	 highly	
politicised.		
	
Conclusion	
	
This	article	argued	that	the	formation	of	French	preferences	during	the	Eurozone	crisis	
(2010-2017)	is	influenced	by	three	factors.	First,	our	research	results	show	that	French	
economic	 governance	 is	 dominated	 by	 a	 small	 number	 of	 civil	 servants	 and	 banks’	
representatives	 who	 form	 homogenous	 policy	 networks.	 Thus,	 the	 convergence	 of	
preferences	 between	 the	 French	 government	 and	 its	 banks	 foster	 the	 emergence	 of	
“economic	 patriotism”	 within	 a	 “post-dirigist”	 state.	 The	 temporal	 and	 financial	
pressures	 stemming	 from	 the	 financial	 crisis	 exacerbate	 these	 dynamics	 of	
entanglement	 and	 reinforce	 the	 “state-finance	 nexus”	 (Braun	 et	 al.	 2018).	 It	 is	 also	
important	 to	 note	 that	 economic	 patriotism	 does	 not	 mean	 a	 shift	 of	 preferences	
towards	 intergovernmental	 governance.	 Rather,	 the	 policy	 networks	 defining	 French	
economic	patriotism	advocate	for	further	EU	integration	and	would	actively	support	a	
new	EU	treaty	if	it	would	be	politically	feasible.		
	
Second,	French	preferences	are	influenced	by	the	Eurozone	institutional	structure	and	
power	 games	 even	 before	 member	 states	 start	 the	 intergovernmental	 bargaining	
process.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Germany’s	 economic	 power	 and	 legal	 organisation	 nudge	
French	negotiators	to	internalise	German’s	red	lines	when	building-up	their	own	policy	
preferences.	On	the	other	hand,	the	iterative	nested	games	that	characterise	Eurozone	
macroeconomic	policies	are	a	window	of	opportunity	for	French	negotiators	to	further	
their	interests	and	protect	their	own	red	lines.		
	
Third,	 and	 finally,	 contrary	 to	 the	 German	 and	 Dutch	 cases	 domestic	 politics	 and	
electoral	 outcomes	 did	 not	 affect	 the	 formation	 of	 French	 preferences	 during	 the	
negotiation	of	 the	 four	policy	 items	we	 focused	on	(entails	different	results	however).	
Yet,	 the	 logics	 of	 negotiations	 at	 EU	 level	 influenced	 domestic	 politics	 in	 a	 rather	
impressive	 manner:	 the	 French	 policy	 U-turn	 on	 the	 TSCG	 was	 conducive	 to	 the	
historical	collapse	of	the	Socialist	party	in	2017.		
	
One	 important	 venue	 for	 further	 research	 on	 the	 formation	 of	 domestic	 economic	
preferences	in	times	of	crisis	is	the	study	of	the	intertwining	between	issue	salience	and	
the	 influence	 of	 a	 member	 state’s	 public	 opinion.	 First,	 policy	 salience	 does	 not	
automatically	 rise	when	 economic	 crises	 occur.	 Rather,	 the	 salience	 of	 a	 given	 policy	
varies	 according	 to	 its	 perceived	 complexity	 and	 the	 stages	 of	 the	 crisis	 resolution	
process.	 Financial	 rescue	 schemes	 were	 not	 salient	 in	 the	 French	 polity,	 contrary	 to	
fiscal	issues.	Above	all,	the	TSCG	was	certainly	the	most	politicised	topic	of	our	four	case	
studies.	Second,	even	when	policy	salience	leads	to	more	pressure	from	voters,	political	
parties	and	other	administrative	bodies,	these	pressures	do	not	automatically	shift	the	
member	state’s	policy	preferences,	as	 shown	by	 the	continuity	of	French	positions	on	
the	TSCG.	Studies	focusing	on	polls	and	discursive	analysis	are	not	yet	well-equipped	to	
assess	 the	 impact	 on	 outside	 pressures	 on	 the	 policymaking	 process	 and,	 more	
generally,	 to	 open	 up	 the	 black	 box	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 preferences.	 From	 our	
perspective,	interviewing	high-level	policy-makers	is	the	most	reliable	methodology	to	
assess	whether	 the	 politicisation	 of	 post-crisis	 Eurozone	policies	 translate	 into	 policy	
change.		
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